Supreme Court Cases

On January 20, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Perry v. Perez. This case involved efforts to redraw Texas’ electoral districts due to an increase of four million residents identified by the 2010 Census. Texas proposed a new electoral plan, but as a “covered jurisdiction” was required by the Voting Rights Act to obtain preclearance from a special court in Washington, D.C. before the plan could take effect. While Texas’ petition for preclearance was pending, several groups challenged the proposed plan in federal court in Texas, which then drafted an interim electoral plan for use in upcoming 2012 elections. The question before the Supreme Court was whether this interim plan improperly disregarded details of the plan proposed by Texas.

In a per curiam opinion, the Court unanimously held that it was unclear whether the federal court in Texas had followed appropriate standards in drafting its interim plan. The Court therefore vacated the interim plan and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion.

To discuss the case, we have Ilya Shapiro, who is a senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute.

On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in National Meat Association v. Harris. The question in this case was whether the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempts a California statute prescribing what slaughterhouses must do with pigs that are unable to walk. The lower court determined that the state statute did not regulate the inspection or slaughtering process itself, and therefore was not preempted by the FMIA.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court unanimously voted to reverse the decision of the lower court, holding the FMIA does indeed preempt the California statute at issue.

To discuss the case we have John Ohlendorf, who is an Olin-Searle-Smith Fellow in Law at Northwestern University School of Law.

On January 17, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Filarsky v. Delia. The question in this case is whether a lawyer retained to assist government employees with an internal affairs investigation may, in a subsequent lawsuit against the lawyer arising out of the lawyer’s conduct during the investigation, assert the “qualified immunity” defense available to government employees in such circumstances.

To discuss the case, we have Scott Martin, who is an associate in the DC office of Gibson, Dunn, and Crutcher.

On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Reynolds v. United States. The question in this case concerns whether the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) requires an offender who was convicted before the passage of SORNA to register thereunder even though the legislation appears to leave that determination to the Attorney General. A lower court determined that SORNA itself required pre-SORNA offenders to register even if the Attorney General had not yet deemed that requirement applicable to them.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. By a vote of 7-2, the Court held that SORNA’s registration requirements, properly interpreted, do not apply to pre-SORNA offenders until the Attorney General so specifies. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg.

To discuss the case, we have Michael DeBow, who is a professor at the Samford University Cumberland School of Law.

On January 10, 2012 the Supreme Court heard oral argument in FCC v. Fox. The question in this case is whether the Federal Communications Commission’s standards for indecency are too vague to be constitutional.

To discuss the case we have Erik Jaffe, a Washington, D.C. attorney who specializes in appellate litigation, and Patrick Brennan, who is Associate Dean of Academic Affairs and Professor at the Villanova University School of Law.

On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Perry v. New Hampshire. The question here was whether, in a criminal case, the Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires a court to evaluate the reliability of an eyewitness identification of the defendant when the circumstances under which the identification occurred were suggestive, regardless of how those circumstances came about. The lower court rejected the defendant’s argument in favor of such a rule, concluding that a court is required to assess the reliability of identification evidence only when law enforcement employs suggestive identification techniques.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court by a vote of 8-1. Where there is no improper law enforcement activity involved, the Court held, it suffices to test reliability through the normal rights and opportunities afforded for that purpose, such as the presence of counsel at post-indictment lineups and vigorous cross-examination. Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, and Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion.

To discuss the case, we have Jessie Liu, who is a partner at Jenner & Block, LLP.

On January 10, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Smith v. Cain. The question in this case was whether a murder suspect’s Brady rights were violated because his attorney’s office failed to hand over evidence that could have helped in his defense.

In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower courts, and held by a vote of 8-1 that the petitioner’s Brady claims demand a reversal of his conviction. Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.

To discuss the case, we have Adam Conrad, an associate at King and Spaulding.

On January 18, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Golan v. Holder. The question in this case is whether Congress has the power to restore copyright protection to certain works that have entered the public domain.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Ginsburg, the Court affirmed by a vote of 6-2 that Congress does have the authority to put certain works that have entered the public domain back under copyright protection. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

To discuss the case, we have Christopher Newman, who is an Assistant Professor at the George Mason University School of Law.

On January 10, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Knox v. SEIU. This case presents two questions. The first is whether a state may lawfully require that state employees who are not union members pay a special union assessment intended for ideological political expenditures, without first providing notice and an opportunity to object. The second question is whether a state my lawfully require that state employees who are not union members pay union fees to finance political expenditures for ballot measures.

To discuss the case we have John Eastman, who is a professor at the Chapman University School of Law.

On January 10, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Minneci v. Pollard. The question in this case was whether prison inmates may invoke the Bivens doctrine to bring suit against the employees of a private company hired by the federal government to provide services for the prison.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held by a vote of 8-1 that it could not imply a Bivens remedy here because state law authorized alternative damages actions that provide both significant deterrence and compensation. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, wrote an opinion concurring in the Court’s judgment. Justice Ginsberg filed a dissenting opinion.

To discuss the case, we have Alexander Volokh, who is an assistant professor at Emory University School of Law.

On January 9, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Sackett v. EPA. This case involves two landowners who graded a lot in a residential subdivision so that they could build a home there. The Environmental Protection Agency then issued to the landowners an administrative compliance order stating that the graded lot was a wetland, and directing the landowners either to remove the fill and restore the lot to its original condition, or risk civil fines in the amount of thousands of dollars for each day of non-compliance. The question before the Court is whether the landowners may seek judicial review of the EPA’s compliance order before it is actually enforced against them and, if the answer to that question is “no,” whether the compliance order deprives the landowners of due process of law.

To discuss the case, we have Elizabeth Papez, who is a Partner at Winston & Strawn, LLP. ??

On January 10, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Gonzalez v. Thaler. This case presents two questions arising under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The first is whether a judge’s failure, when issuing a certificate of appealability under AEDPA, to “indicate” the constitutional issue that a state prisoner has raised deprives a court of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear that prisoner’s habeas appeal. The second question involves how to determine when a judgment became “final” for purposes of calculating the one-year limit that state prisoners have in which to file a federal habeas petition.??

In an opinion delivered by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held by a vote of 8-1 that (1) a judge’s failure to “indicate” the requisite constitutional issue raised by a state prisoner does not deprive a court of appeals of jurisdiction to hear a state prisoner’s habeas appeal, and (2) for a state prisoner who does not seek review in the state’s highest court, judgment becomes final on the date that the time for seeking such review expires. On that basis, the Court affirmed the decision of the lower court that the state prisoner’s federal habeas petition was time-barred. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion.

To discuss the case, we have Ozan Varol, who is a Visiting Assistant Professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law.

On January 10, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood. This case involved the Credit Repair Organizations Act, or CROA, which requires credit repair organizations to provide consumers with a disclosure informing them that they have a right to sue credit repair organizations that violate the Act. At issue was whether a credit repair company that is being sued by former customers under CROA can force those customers to arbitrate their claims based on an arbitration provision contained in the customers’ credit card applications.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court held by a vote of 8-1 that CROA does not address the arbitrability of claims made under thereunder, and the Federal Arbitration Act therefore requires the arbitration agreement in this case to be enforced according to its terms. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan. Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion.

To discuss the case, we have Christopher Drahozal, a professor at the University of Kansas School of Law.

On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals. The question before the Court is whether Congress, in passing the “self-care” provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity of states. Under the self-care provision, a state worker may sue if the state interferes with the worker’s statutory right to a certain amount of leave due to a personal, debilitating health condition.

To discuss the case, we have Elizabeth Price Foley, who is a Professor at the Florida International University School of Law.

On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Pacific Operators Offshore LLP v. Valladolid. The question in this case was whether an employee who spent nearly all his time working on an offshore platform--but was killed in an accident at an onshore facility--suffered his injuries “as the result of” operations conducted on the outer continental shelf, thereby giving his widow a claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, by way of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA). An administrative law judge and review board denied benefits because the accident occurred onshore, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that a benefits claimant need only establish a “substantial nexus” between the injury and extractive operations on the outer continental shelf.

In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas and joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, the Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. The OCSLA, the Court held, extends coverage to an employee who can establish a substantial nexus between his injury and his employer’s extractive operations on the outer continental shelf. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Alito joined.

To discuss the case, we have Richard Epstein, professor at New York University School of Law and professor emeritus at the University of Chicago Law School.

On January 11, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. This case presents the question whether the “ministerial exception” to federal employment discrimination statutes--an exception that generally shields religious organizations from claims of unlawful discrimination by employees who perform religious functions--applies to a teacher at a religious elementary school who alleged that the termination of her employment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act. The lower appellate court concluded that the teacher did not qualify as a “minister” and that the exception therefore provided no defense against the teacher’s lawsuit.

In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts the Supreme Court reversed, holding unanimously that the teacher did qualify as a minister and that the “ministerial exception” barred her suit challenging the church’s decision to terminate her employment. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion; Justice Alito also filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kagan.

To discuss the case, we have Michael McConnell, a professor at Stanford Law School.

On December 12, 2011 the Supreme Court announced its decision in Judulang v. Holder. This case addresses the policy of the Board of Immigration Appeals regarding when resident aliens convicted of certain offenses may apply to the Attorney General for relief from deportation.

Prior to 1996, denial of entry to aliens who had not been admitted to the United States was described as “exclusion,” while the removal of aliens already admitted to the United States was termed “deportation.” In certain circumstances a provision of immigration law allowed the Attorney General to grant relief to aliens in exclusion proceedings, but this provision did not apply to similarly situated aliens in deportation proceedings. The Board of Immigration Appeals would nevertheless make relief available, but only if the basis for deportation was “substantially equivalent” to an analogous grounds for exclusion. This was known as the “comparable grounds” rule.

Here, petitioner Judulang was subject to deportation and denied the opportunity to seek relief because the Board determined that his underlying offense was not comparable to any of the possible grounds for exclusion. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court reversed, holding unanimously that the Board’s “comparable grounds” rule was “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act.

To discuss the case, we have Jeffrey Pojanowski, who is a professor at the University of Notre Dame Law School.

On January 9, 2012, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Blumen v. FEC. The question in this case was whether a federal statute that prohibits foreign nationals, who in this case were present in the United States on temporary work visas, from making contributions to candidates or to political parties, or from making express advocacy expenditures with respect to U.S. elections, violated these persons’ First Amendment rights. A three-judge panel in the lower court rejected the foreign nationals’ claim that their rights had been violated. In a one-sentence order, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the lower court’s judgment.

To discuss the case, we have Allison Hayward, the Vice President of Policy at the Center for Competitive Politics.

On December 7, 2011, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana. This case involves a dispute over title to portions of various riverbeds in the State of Montana, riverbeds now occupied by hydropower projects owned by a utility company. The dispute turns on the extent to which the rivers involved are deemed “navigable,” because States generally take title to lands beneath navigable waters. The question before the Court is whether the test for navigability looks only to the navigability of a river at the time the State joined the Union, or also includes subsequent and present-day use.

To discuss the case we have Donald Kochan, who is a Professor at the Chapman University School of Law.

On December 7, 2011, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. The question in this case is whether a patent can be issued for an observed correlation between blood test results and patient reactions to prescription drugs.

To discuss the case we have Adam Mossoff, who is a professor at George Mason University School of Law.